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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a large state university.  The state is facing a budget 
crisis and is looking for ways to save money.  Instead of taking a 
site license from Microsoft to use Microsoft Office, an Information 
Technology staff member purchases one copy from the bookstore.  
The staff member is very technically savvy and breaks the copy-
code.  She then runs off 30,000 copies and gives one copy to each 
student.  Each copy has the Microsoft trademarks on it.  Further, 
most of the university faculty, faced with numerous protests by the 
students over rising tuition costs and compounded by the economic 
slowdown, create digital files of the assigned readings for each of 
the students, and either hand them out or puts them on e-reserve.  
The professors do not assign, nor do their students purchase for 
that matter, any books.  Everything is done electronically.  Maybe 
the university‘s radio station cancels its ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC 
music licenses but continues broadcasting, nonetheless.  Or 
perhaps the university‘s accounting office is using a patented 
―business method‖ without paying royalties.  Obviously, the 
software company, the print publishers, various music publishers, 
the patent owners, and the trademark owners would want to sue the 
university to recover revenue lost from the infringement—a lot of 
revenue. 
Section 501 of Title 17 of the United States Code addresses 
copyright infringement and defines an ―infringer‖ as ―anyone,‖ 
including a state, ―who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
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copyright owner.‖1  A similar provision in § 271 of Title 35 
expressly provides that a state shall be liable for patent 
infringement.
2
  Moreover, owing to the fact that state law is 
preempted both by patent and copyright law, state law claims 
having the same elements as infringement—such as 
misappropriation and unjust enrichment—are foreclosed, forcing 
recovery only through a federal patent or copyright infringement 
claim in the federal courts.
3
 
It seems as though the State is in trouble.  Any doubt regarding 
the general language in § 501 of the Copyright Act and § 271 of 
the Patent Act has been removed by the unequivocal language that 
was added in 1990 and 1992 respectively.
4
  The statutes say that 
States are included in the class of potential defendants and are 
expressly not immune from liability under the sovereign immunity 
doctrine, so what is a State to do to avoid having to pay major 
damages?  Nothing, that‘s what!  In 1996, the landscape for claims 
against States was completely changed by the case of Seminole 
 
 1 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (defining infringer as ―any State, any instrumentality of a 
State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or 
her official capacity‖ and providing for no limitation on liability for such an entity); see 
also id. § 511(a) (stating explicitly that a government entity or actor ―shall not be 
immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or 
under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity‖ for a suit brought in Federal Court for a 
violation under Title 17). 
 2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a) & (h) (2011) (providing full liability for any State actor or 
entity which infringes a patent even acting in an official capacity); see also id. § 296(a) 
(stating explicitly that a State actor or entity ―shall not be immune, under the Eleventh 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of 
sovereign immunity‖ for a suit brought in Federal Court for a violation under Title 35). 
 3 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (preempting state law for copyright claims); see also Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (holding that the 
Supremacy Clause preempted a Florida statute dealing with intellectual property rights 
for boat hulls).  Further, in Bonito, the Court held that ―States may not offer patent-like 
protection to intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter 
of federal law.‖ Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156; see also Michael B. Landau, Problems 
Arising Out of the Use of “www.trademark.com”: The Application of Principles of 
Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 463 n.29 
(1997) (noting that federal patent law preempts state claims even though there is no 
express provision in the Patent Act). 
 4 See discussion infra Section VIII.A. 
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Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
5
  By rejecting Congress‘ heretofore 
assumed Article I power to abrogate state sovereign immunity with 
clear and unequivocal language, Seminole dramatically changed 
the balance of power between the States and copyright and patent 
holders. 
Seminole was followed by Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank (Florida 
Prepaid I),
6
 which reinforced the notion that Article I abrogation 
was unconstitutional.  But Florida Prepaid I went further.  Despite 
noting that patents are ―property,‖ the Court held that Congress 
failed to show that patent infringement by the State constituted a 
widespread pattern in need of remediation and so could not 
abrogate sovereign immunity under its section 5 power of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
7
  Cases that have followed over the years 
have almost all held that a State is immune from liability under 
sovereign immunity, or that the unauthorized use is not a ―taking.‖  
Courts have done this by merely citing either Seminole or the 
Florida Prepaid cases instead of looking to the dangerous growing 
trend of copyright and patent infringement by the States.
8
  By 
2012, there is a constant and widespread pattern of infringement—
not merely a handful of cases—that requires remediation.  Also, 
notably the composition of the Supreme Court has changed since it 
decided Seminole and the Florida Prepaid cases. 
No State should be immune from infringement.  Immunity puts 
States in an advantageous situation vis-à-vis the federal 
government—which can be sued for monetary damages for 
 
 5 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 6 527 U.S. 627 (1999).  The Court, on the same day, also decided a companion false 
advertising case to Florida Prepaid I, in which the Court held that there was no property 
interest in preventing someone from making false statements about his products. Coll. 
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (Florida Prepaid II), 527 
U.S. 666 (1999).  This article will deal primarily with copyright and patent, and will just 
touch slightly on trademarks. 
 7 Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 636–40 (1999). See discussion infra Section VIII.B. 
 8 Courts have dismissed copyright cases by citing Seminole and Chavez v. Arte 
Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000). See, e.g., Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093–96 (S.D. Cal. 2008).  
Chavez, it should be noted, is a Fifth Circuit case, not a Supreme Court case. 
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copyright and patent infringement, but not enjoined from 
continuing to infringe the intellectual property.  While the public 
interest might be served by allowing a State to use copyrighted 
material or a new technological development without being 
enjoined,
9
 on the other hand, it is disserved by the courts allowing 
that State to not pay for its unauthorized use.  It is time to rethink 
state sovereign immunity with regard to intellectual property. 
This paper will look at the sovereign immunity and intellectual 
property dilemma.  Part I presents the twisted history of the 
Eleventh Amendment, and Part II examines competing theories of 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  Part III investigates the 
Seminole case.  Part IV addresses the Ex parte Young exception.  
Part V lays out intellectual property cases both before and after 
Seminole.  Part VI looks at the analogous area of bankruptcy and 
how the courts suddenly allowed waiver in that area.  Finally, part 
VII discusses legislative action to get around sovereign immunity.  
  
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
Short and seemingly clear, the Eleventh Amendment of the 
United States Constitution has nonetheless been the subject of 
some of the Supreme Court‘s most convoluted and unprincipled 
constitutional interpretation.  The Eleventh Amendment provides 
that ―[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
 
 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, in order to sue the government for patent or copyright 
infringement, a patentee or copyright holder must bring an action for compensation in the 
Court of Federal Claims, not in the local district court.  The patentee may not enjoin the 
federal government from using the patent.  Section 1498(a) provides, in relevant part: 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the 
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States 
without license of the owner thereof or the lawful right to use or 
manufacture the same,  the owner‘s remedy shall be by action against 
the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the 
recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and 
manufacture.  
Id.  Section 1498(b) applies to copyright infringement. 
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State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.‖10  Over the 
years, the Supreme Court—often as a function of its 
composition—has varied in its answers to the questions of what the 
language means, which suits are barred, and what relation the 
amendment has to other legislation. 
A. Ratification of the Amendment: A Reaction to Chisholm v. 
Georgia 
The introduction and subsequent ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment was a swift and direct response to the 1793 Supreme 
Court decision of Chisholm v. Georgia.
11
  In Chisholm, the 
executor of a decedent out-of-state merchant brought suit in federal 
court against the state of Georgia for a contract debt incurred when 
the merchant supplied Revolutionary War materials to Georgia.
12
  
The Supreme Court held by a four to one majority—in a seriatim 
decision, as was customary for the time—that Georgia was 
amenable to suit.
13
  The majority‘s reasoning was grounded in the 
plain meaning of the diversity clauses of Article III.
14
  There is, 
however, still debate about which aspect of the clauses the decision 
rested. 
Justice Stevens argued in the dissent in Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida,
15
 that the Chisholm decision was a ―not 
 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 11 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 12 See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 47–
48 (1972) (relating the facts which lead to Chisholm‘s suit against Georgia). 
 13 Id. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.), 465–66 (opinion of Wilson, J.), 469 (opinion of 
Cushing, J.), 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 14 Id. at 451–52 (opinion of Blair, J.), 465–66 (opinion of Wilson, J.), 467–68 (opinion 
of Cushing, J.), 474–76 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).  The first diversity clause provides in 
relevant part: 
The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or 
more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between 
Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, 
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  The second diversity clause provides in relevant part: ―In 
all Cases . . . in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction.‖ U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 15 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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implausible,‖ but nonetheless incorrect, interpretation of the 
second diversity clause,
16
 which vests original jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court for suits ―in which a State shall be a Party.‖17  
According to Justice Stevens, the Chisholm majority was wrong 
because it incorrectly construed the grant of original jurisdiction as 
a binding obligation on the Court, without Congress having 
authority to impart to a state a sovereign immunity defense.
18
 
On the other hand, in his dissent in Seminole, Justice Souter 
found Chisholm to be a ―reasonable‖ interpretation of the first 
diversity clause, in which the plain meaning of the text clearly 
authorizes suits against a state by an out-of-state citizen.
19
  The 
rationale behind the Chisholm Court‘s interpretation of Article III‘s 
plain meaning, according to Justice Souter, rests on a quid pro quo 
principle—abrogation of state sovereign immunity in a federal 
forum in exchange for membership in the Union.
20
 
Going back to Chisholm itself, it must be noted that whatever 
the rationale behind the decision, the four majority Justices had 
exceptional knowledge in debating and deliberating the intent of 
the Constitution‘s framers.  Chief Justice John Jay was an author of 
the Federalist Papers and a delegate to New York‘s ratification 
convention.
21
  Justices John Blair and James Wilson attended the 
Constitutional Convention as delegates, and Justice William 
Cushing chaired the Massachusetts state ratification convention.
22
 
Justice Iredell‘s lone dissent in Chisholm is almost as non-
revealing of its logical foundations as is the majority‘s opinion.  
Justice Iredell‘s finding that the out-of-state citizen suit against 
Georgia was impermissible seems chiefly based not on Article III, 
but rather on statutory interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
23
  
 
 16 Id. at 81 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 18 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 19 See id. at 109–16 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 20 See id. at 104–06 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 21 JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 22–23 (1987) [hereinafter ORTH, JUDICIAL POWER]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 436–37 (1793) (―[L]ooking at [the 
Judiciary Act of 1789], which I consider is on this occasion the limit of our authority 
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Because the Judiciary Act did not expressly confer the ability to 
sue a state in assumpsit, Justice Iredell reasoned that general 
―principles and usages of law‖ must determine whether such a suit 
was permissible.
24
  Concluding that at the time of the Chisholm 
decision no state legislatively consented to be a defendant in suits 
for money damages, Justice Iredell next examined English 
common law and determined that assumpsit suits were also never 
permitted.
25
  Whether his dissent went further and concluded that 
Article III barred Congress from specifically allowing such suits is 
a matter of some debate.
26
 
 
(whatever further might be constitutionaly [sic], enacted) we can exercise no authority in 
the present instance consistently with the clear intention of the act.‖ (emphasis added)).  
Justice Iredell further stated that ―as the [Judiciary Act] stands at present, [the suit] is not 
maintainable; whatever opinion may be entertained; upon the construction of the 
Constitution, as to the power of Congress to authorize such a one.‖ Id. at 437. 
 24 Id. at 433–36. 
 25 Id. at 430, 435. 
The only principles of law, then, that can be regarded, are those 
common to all the States.  I know of none such, which can affect this 
case, but those that are derived from what is properly termed ―the 
common law,‖ a law which I presume is the ground-work of the laws 
in every State in the Union, and which I consider, so far as it is 
applicable to the Peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no 
special act of Legislation controls it, to be in force in each State, as it 
existed in England, (unaltered by statute) at the time of the first 
settlement of the country. 
Id. at 435. 
 26 As Justice Iredell repeated throughout his dissent, the focus of his reasoning was the 
statutory construction of the Judiciary Act.  He did, however, note—in what he conceded 
to be in some measure extra-judicial—that ―it may not be improper to intimate that my 
present opinion is strongly against any construction of [the Constitution], which will 
admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of 
money.‖ Id. at 449–50.  Professor Chemerinsky notes in his treatise that Justice Iredell 
―concluded that the general language of Article III was insufficient to authorize such a 
suit against the state of Georgia without its consent.‖ ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 7.2 (5th ed. 2007).  On the other hand, Justice Stevens‘ dissent in 
Seminole flatly rejected any suggestion that Justice Iredell contemplated the 
constitutional question of sovereign immunity, finding instead that ―he did not proceed to 
resolve the further question whether the Constitution went so far as to prevent Congress 
from withdrawing a State‘s immunity.‖ Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 80 
(1996).  This comports with Professor Orth‘s view that Justice Iredell understood the 
Constitution to authorize state-defendant suits and so ―rested his dissent on the Judiciary 
Act instead.‖ ORTH, JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 21, at 22.  Although Justice Souter 
acknowledged Justice Iredell‘s statement confessing a strong opinion that the 
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Within weeks of the Court‘s final judgment in Chisholm, both 
houses of Congress had approved the proposed Eleventh 
Amendment and sent it to the states for ratification.
27
  The impetus 
for congressional action lay not merely in a principled response to 
the Court‘s affront to state sovereign immunity.  There was 
widespread practical concern that successful suits against a state 
for money damages would prove financially ruinous for state 
defendants.
28
  While preservation of state coffers may have been 
an incentive for ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, for almost a 
century the amendment had little effect as a bar to suit,
29
 primarily 
due to Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
30
 which held that the 
Eleventh Amendment applied only when the state was the party of 
record.
31
  Avoiding the bar was simply a matter of naming a state 
official as the party to the suit in place of the State itself. 
 
Constitution barred suit against a state, he thought Justice Iredell‘s concern on statutory 
construction ―an odd focus, had he believed that Congress lacked the constitutional 
authority to impose liability.‖ Seminole, 517 U.S. at 108 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 27 See John V. Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A 
Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 428 n.41 (1983) [hereinafter 
Orth, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment]. 
 28 See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 99 
(1922). But see JACOBS, supra note 12, at 69–71 (maintaining that preservation of state 
coffers was not a significant factor in Eleventh Amendment ratification). 
 29 See Orth, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 27, at 428–31. 
 30 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 31 Id. at 857.  A more complex rationale for Osborn‘s result is that given that a state 
cannot authorize an unconstitutional act, the act must be the result of an individual‘s 
action, and it is that individual who is to be held accountable. See Orth, Interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 27, at 429; see generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123 (1908).  In the Ex parte Young action against Georgia State University, the Northern 
District of Georgia held that ―Georgia State as an entity is not capable of copying or 
reproducing copyrighted materials or making the individual fair use determinations.‖ 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE, slip op. at 19 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 
30, 2010). 
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B. The Eleventh Amendment Re-emerges: Post Reconstruction 
and Hans v. Louisiana 
During Reconstruction, the sale of state bonds was the only 
viable means Southern states had to raise much needed cash.
32
  In 
the face of insurmountable debt, all Southern states defaulted or 
repudiated at least part of their obligations.
33
  Perhaps in 
recognition of imminent state bankruptcy should suits for 
Reconstruction debt be permitted against a state,
34
 or perhaps 
because of concern that the federal government lacked the 
willpower to enforce a Supreme Court ruling requiring payment of 
incurred debt,
35
 the Court suddenly disavowed Osborn and 
broadened the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment.
36
 
Although it was decided in 1890, almost one hundred years 
after the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, Hans v. Louisiana
37
 
is a watershed case.  Hans expanded the Eleventh Amendment 
beyond its literal scope by extending protection to states sued by 
in-state citizens, something which the wording of the amendment 
plainly does not bar.  In Hans, a Louisianan bondholder brought 
suit against the state of Louisiana to compel the interest payment 
on his bond.
38
  The State argued that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred the suit, and the Court agreed.
39
  Recognizing that nothing 
in the Eleventh Amendment‘s language proscribed suits by in-state 
 
 32 See Orth, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 27, at 433 & n.74.  
Southern states incurred additional debt during Reconstruction of more than one hundred 
million dollars. Id. (listing various scholars‘ estimates of incurred indebtedness). 
 33 Id. at 435; see also B. U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 162–64 (1941) 
(listing amounts of state repudiated debt). 
 34 See ORTH, JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 21, at 73. 
 35 Orth, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 27, at 449 (noting that a 
ruling against the state would have required tax collecting and disbursement by the very 
state officials elected to prevent debt servicing; in the face of such opposition ―[o]nly 
overwhelming force could have availed, and the national will to coerce the South was 
lacking‖). 
 36 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (preventing suit against state by in-
state citizen); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890) (reaching the same 
conclusion as Hans and decided the same day). 
 37 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 38 Id. at 1. 
 39 Id. at 20–21. 
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citizens, the Court nonetheless feared that confining its decision to 
the literal interpretation of the Amendment, thereby allowing the 
suit, would produce a ―result [that] is no less startling and 
unexpected than was the original decision of this court . . . in the 
case of Chisholm v. Georgia.‖40  Without any historical evidence 
regarding the amendment‘s intended scope, the Court disregarded 
the plain meaning of the provision, reasoning instead that those 
who adopted the amendment must have believed that it would 
serve to bar all suits against a state absent the state‘s consent: 
Can we suppose that, when the eleventh amendment 
was adopted, it was understood to be left open for 
citizens of a state to sue their own state in the 
federal courts, while the idea of suits by citizens of 
other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly 
repelled?  Suppose that congress, when proposing 
the eleventh amendment, had appended to it a 
proviso that nothing therein contained should 
prevent a state from being sued by its own citizens 
in cases arising under the constitution or laws of the 
United States, can we imagine that it would have 
been adopted by the states?  The supposition that it 
would is almost an absurdity on its face.
41
 
Finding that a suit by an in-state citizen was barred—despite 
the amendment‘s silence on the issue—the Court was firmly 
planted on the path to wide-ranging judicial interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
 
 40 Id. at 10–11. 
 41 Id. at 15.  In this paragraph, we have chosen to ignore the lack of capitalization of 
the Eleventh Amendment and Congress.  There is debate on how the original intent of the 
framers regarding capitalization should be maintained.  For example, in the Constitution 
itself, nouns were capitalized, much as they are in modern German.  ―To promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts . . . .‖   When the operative language from the 
clause is repeated without capitals, ―(sic)‖ is not included to indicate that the current 
author strayed from the original language. 
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II. COMPETING THEORIES OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Hans Court‘s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 
stretching the amendment beyond its literal grasp, remains—
depending on one‘s view of Eleventh Amendment—either a 
perplexing decision that must be begrudgingly reconciled or 
overruled entirely, or an underpinning of modern Eleventh 
Amendment construction and jurisprudence, varying with the 
times. 
A. The Eleventh Amendment Broadly Restricts Article III 
Jurisdiction 
Of the possible theories, the constitutional immunity 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment sweeps the broadest, 
constitutionally barring suit against a state brought by any 
citizen—whether in-state or out-of-state, or whether subject matter 
jurisdiction is based on diversity or a federal question.  Those who 
advocate this theory point to the fact that overruling Chisholm 
required a constitutional amendment and not simply congressional 
statutory adoption.
42
  According to the argument, at the time of the 
Chisholm decision everyone but the Court seemed to understand 
that sovereign immunity was a concept of constitutional 
proportion.
43
 
The outcome in Hans more easily supports the constitutional 
immunity theory of the Eleventh Amendment than any other 
theory.  This theory proposes that, although Hans recognized that 
the words of the Eleventh Amendment may strictly apply only to 
out-of-state citizen suits, in reality sovereign immunity is greater 
than the Eleventh Amendment alone.  Sovereign immunity, 
antecedent to the Constitution, is the foundation on which the 
Constitution stands, and all immunity not expressly removed by 
the Constitution remains. 
 
 42 Cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 79–81 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting the alternate theory as to why a constitutional amendment was 
required to overrule Chisholm). 
 43 Id. at 81. 
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Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal 
application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or 
assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment 
exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-
consenting States.  Behind the words of the 
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit 
and control.  There is the essential postulate that the 
controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be 
of a justiciable character.  There is also the postulate 
that States of the Union, still possessing attributes 
of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without 
their consent, save where there has been a 
―surrender of this immunity in the plan of the 
convention.‖44 
Logically, there are at least two difficulties with finding an 
antecedent but still viable immunity.  First, stating that sovereign 
immunity exists absent surrendering it creates a tautology similar 
to that of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves for the states all 
powers not expressly granted to the federal government.
45
  The 
Tenth Amendment tautology however is self-contained within the 
corners of the Constitution, in fact it is wholly contained within the 
amendment itself,
46
 while the Eleventh Amendment tautology 
relies for its completion on an extra-constitutional concept that is 
antecedent to the Constitution.  Second, and more troubling, a 
limiting doctrine of immunity that is not found in the Constitution 
 
 44 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 68 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322–23 
(1934) (citations and footnotes omitted)); see also Pennsylvania. v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U.S. 1, 32–33 (1989).  Justice Scalia noted, 
What we said in Hans was, essentially, that the Eleventh Amendment 
was important not merely for what it said but for what it reflected: a 
consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as well 
as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood 
background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which 
its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away. 
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 45 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 46 The Tenth Amendment states: ―The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.‖  
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itself—but is instead derived from some antecedent source—
smacks of natural law and seems at direct odds with the 
Supremacy Clause.
47
 
Regardless, the Supreme Court has at times held that sovereign 
immunity is a constitutional bar to suits against a state, and that 
Hans correctly recognized the constitutionality of the prohibition.  
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
48
 the Court 
―affirm[ed] that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity 
limits the grant of judicial authority in Art[icle] III.‖49  Recently, in 
Seminole, the Court embraced the broadest constitutional theory of 
the Eleventh Amendment thus far, holding that the amendment 
extends beyond its words and prevents congressional expansion of 
Article III powers through the exercise of its Article I authority.
50
 
The constitutional immunity theory effectively equates the 
concept of sovereign immunity to subject matter jurisdiction, 
which bars any suit outside those expressed in the second section 
of Article III, and prohibits congressional expansion of its scope.
51
  
Because the Eleventh Amendment implicitly bars all suits against 
a state, this theory maintains that Congress absolutely lacks, absent 
an additional constitutional amendment, the power to change the 
scope of suits permissible in federal court.  But the Eleventh 
Amendment does not fit entirely nicely within the contours of 
subject matter jurisdiction, for it is—and yet is not—like subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Similarly, an Eleventh Amendment concern 
can be first raised on appeal, even though it has not been argued or 
objected to in the trial court.
52
  However, sovereign immunity may 
be waived; unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be 
consented to even if both parties so desire.
53
  Nor does the 
Eleventh Amendment impose a duty in jurisdiction sua sponte—
 
 47 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at § 7.3. 
 48 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
 49 Id. at 98. 
 50 See id. at 64–65. 
 51 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.2 (2d ed. 1993). 
 52 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677–78 (1974). 
 53 E.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (noting that ―States 
may waive their sovereign immunity‖); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) 
(holding that states ―shall be immune from suits, without their consent‖).  
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analogous to a court‘s duty to raise defects in subject matter 
jurisdiction.
54
  These differences are more than simple academic 
curiosities; they are supporting reasons for rejecting a theory of the 
Eleventh Amendment that views the amendment as an utter bar to 
congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity.
55
 
B. The Eleventh Amendment Only Restricts Diversity Suits 
This theory of the Eleventh Amendment maintains that the 
amendment bars suits in diversity only.  Article III authorizes 
several broad categories of suits, including federal question suits 
and citizen-state diversity suits.  Federal question suits involve ―all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties,‖56 while citizen-state 
diversity suits encompass cases ―between a State and Citizens of 
another State.‖57  The suit at issue in Chisholm was a citizen-state 
diversity suit; that is, an action against a state brought in federal 
court by an out-of-state citizen, and, at least in Chisholm, based on 
state law, not federal law.
58
  Under the diversity theory, Chisholm 
was wrongly decided not because immunity is constitutional, but 
because the majority failed to understand that diversity based 
solely on state law was not enough to abrogate common law 
sovereign immunity.
59
  The Court‘s lack of understanding shows 
that compelling reasons exist for federal courts to carefully apply 
common law or avoid interpreting state laws.
60
  The heart of the 
diversity theory rests on the logic that the Eleventh Amendment 
was enacted in direct response to the Chisholm decision.  The 
Chisholm decision was a pure citizen-state diversity case based 
 
 54 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 51, at § 2.2 (stating that a court is under a duty to 
expose defects in subject matter jurisdiction); see also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 
457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982) (maintaining that the Court has ―never held that [the 
Eleventh Amendment] is jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised and decided by 
this Court on its own motion.‖). 
 55 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1989). 
 56 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 59 William P. Marshall, The Diversity of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical 
Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1391 (1989). 
 60 See id.  
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solely on state law, thus suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment 
extends only to diversity cases and not to federal question cases.
61
  
The Eleventh Amendment was not enacted and passed to 
immunize states for flagrant violations of federal law. 
There is much to support this theory.  First, the Eleventh 
Amendment only speaks to suits ―against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another state,‖62 thus it closely mirrors Article III‘s 
diversity suit language
63—―between a State and Citizens of another 
State.‖64  Second, Congress rejected the first proposed version of 
the Eleventh Amendment,
65
 which provided in part that ―no state 
shall be liable to be made a party defendant . . . at the suit of any 
person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or 
foreigners,‖66 which would have effectively barred both in-state 
and out-of-state citizen suits.  Third, supporting the broader 
concept that the Eleventh Amendment did not intend to 
constitutionalize all state sovereign immunity are the many 
inconsistencies between subject matter jurisdiction—which is truly 
a constitutional limitation on judicial power—and the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Inconsistencies—such as a defendant‘s ability to 
waive immunity but not subject matter jurisdiction and the Court‘s 
ability, even when faced with an obvious Eleventh Amendment 
problem, to grant prospective injunction relief under Ex parte 
Young
67
 but not other types of relief—point to a concept of 
sovereign immunity that is at least partly prudential in nature.
68
 
 
 61 William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition 
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1083–87 (1983) [hereinafter Historical 
Interpretation]; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign 
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1934–39 (1983). 
 62 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 63 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 110 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at § 7.3. 
 64 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 65 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 111 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting GAZETTE OF THE U.S., Feb. 20, 1793, at 303). 
 67 202 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 68 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 126 (Souter, J., dissenting); Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 25–27 
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at § 7.3. 
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While a number of legal scholars support the diversity theory,
69
 
there are several aspects of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 
that weigh against it.  First, while the Amendment may be read to 
apply only to diversity, this is by no means a compelled reading.  
In an argument that cuts both ways, both proponents and 
opponents of the diversity theory conclude that because Article III 
is not self-executing and because there was no statutory enactment 
of federal question jurisdiction until long after the Eleventh 
Amendment‘s ratification, the possibility of federal courts 
entertaining federal questions at the time the Amendment was 
ratified was remote at best.
70
  Opponents of the diversity theory 
assert that the absence of language specifically addressing federal 
question jurisdiction is attributable to the remoteness of a suit so 
grounded.
71
  The argument goes that requiring the Amendment to 
contain reference to an unforeseen event is ―overly exacting,‖72 
and, given that the framers‘ intent was to prevent the emptying of 
state coffers as a result of suits, foreclosing all suits—whether 
grounded in diversity or federal question jurisdiction—is the only 
way to serve that intent. 
On the other hand, proponents of the theory counter that 
because present-day federal question jurisdiction could not be 
contemplated, it is wrong to assign that intent to the Amendment‘s 
drafters.
73
  However, the proponents argue that even though federal 
question jurisdiction might have been speculative, the framers 
 
 69 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 
(1987); Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White 
Knight’s Green Whiskers), 5 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1967); Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, 
supra note 61; Gibbons, supra note 61; Frederic S. Le Clercq, State Immunity and 
Federal Judicial Power—Retreat from National Supremacy, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 361 
(1975); Peter W. Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. 
L.J. 293 (1980). 
 70 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 69–70. 
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. at 70. 
 73 See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1280–82 (1989).  Admittedly, this is a rather 
odd argument considering some of the Justices who advocate the diversity theory—
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens—are hardly known for their judicial 
restraint. 
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were quite aware—precisely because of their strong concern in 
protecting state treasuries—that in rejecting the first version of the 
Amendment that prevented suit by in-state as well as out-of-state 
citizens, they were essentially allowing an out-of-state debt holder 
to assign his interest to an in-state citizen, who could bring the suit 
against the state.
74
  To support their contention that the 
Amendment bars only diversity suits, and not federal question 
suits, proponents of the theory point out that the rejected version of 
the Amendment was directed at state debt owed to foreigners under 
the Treaty of Paris;
75
 because the debt was owed under a treaty, it 
would have qualified even then for federal question adjudication 
under Article III.
76
  The proponents‘ reason that by rejecting the 
Amendment‘s first version—but accepting the final version—the 
framers obviously meant to leave state-defendant, federal question 
jurisdiction open to federal court adjudication.
77
  The proponents‘ 
argument seems somewhat tenuous.  Given that the purpose of the 
Amendment is to protect state treasuries, it is reasonable to assume 
that if the framers truly realized the possibility of using federal 
question jurisdiction to circumvent state sovereign immunity they 
would have foreclosed this avenue also.  However, it is also quite 
clear that, on its face, the Amendment is much more likely to 
address only diversity and not federal question jurisdiction— 
especially a federal question dealing with the blatant disregard for 
federal law by a state. 
Second, the Hans decision, which has stood for over one 
hundred years, is irreconcilable with this theory and must be 
overruled if the diversity theory is to be fully recognized.  Justice 
Souter acknowledged this inconsistency between the Hans 
decision and the diversity theory in Seminole.
78
  But in the interest 
of stare decisis, he maintained that he would not vote to overrule 
Hans, but would instead limit its holding to stand for the 
proposition that ―the Constitution, without more, permits a State to 
 
 74 See id. 
 75 See id.; see also Seminole, 517 U.S. at 111. 
 76 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 112. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 128–29 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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plead sovereign immunity‖ and that Congress can abrogate that 
immunity with clear language.
79
 
A final argument weighing against the diversity theory is that 
overruling Chisholm was effected by constitutional amendment, 
instead of simply by statute.  While this could indicate recognition 
of the constitutional nature of sovereign immunity, it could, given 
the newness of the country, quite plausibly indicate an uncertainty 
on the part of Congress as to how to overturn a Supreme Court 
decision.
80
  Adding to Congress‘ uncertainty was the question of 
whether the Chisholm majority interpreted the Judiciary Act or 
whether it simply ignored the statute entirely.
81
  All told, the 
diversity theory, like the constitutional immunity theory, does not 
fit tightly with either the language of the Eleventh Amendment or 
with cases addressing the Amendment.  However, the diversity 
theory has the advantage of providing a federal avenue for 
adjudication of important federal questions when a state is 
violating either the Constitution or a federal law, an action which 
the constitutional immunity theory does not permit. 
C. The Eleventh Amendment Reinstates Common Law Immunity 
Although premised on different logic, the common law 
immunity theory, like the diversity theory, permits Congress to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity because immunity is not 
constitutional.  This theory proposes that the Eleventh Amendment 
was enacted solely to overrule Chisholm‘s holding that Article III 
permitted suits against a state by out-of-state citizens; thus, the 
Amendment‘s effect was to reinstate the common law immunity 
that was present prior to Article III.
82
  Professor Field, the main 
advocate of this theory, maintains that support for the theory can 
be found in historical sources from the time of the Constitution‘s 
 
 79 Id. at 116–17 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 80 Id. at 119–20. 
 81 Marshall, supra note 59, at 1388–89 (recognizing the weakness in the argument that 
overruling Chisholm by amendment evinces the constitutional dimensions of sovereign 
immunity). 
 82 Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 539–46 (1977). 
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ratification.
83
  Those historical sources conflict, with some who 
ratified the Constitution proposing that Article III abrogated 
sovereign immunity and some proposing that it left immunity 
intact, and this theory reconciles those conflicts by finding that 
sovereign immunity survived the Constitution only as a common 
law doctrine—present, but easily abrogated by Congress.84  Under 
this view, Hans is reconcilable with later court decisions, which 
held that Congress could abrogate immunity, because Hans did not 
constitutionalize any immunity.
85
  The flaw in this analysis is that 
by its very language the Eleventh Amendment is constitutional, at 
least as applied to citizen-state diversity suits.
86
  Certain Justices 
have expressly endorsed the common law immunity theory.
87
  In 
Seminole, Justice Stevens maintained that Hans is consistent with a 
finding that Congress has power under Article I to abrogate 
sovereign immunity by employing the common law immunity 
theory, stating that ―Hans instead reflects, at the most, this Court‘s 
conclusion that, as a matter of federal common law, federal courts 
should decline to entertain suits against unconsenting States.‖88 
D. The Eleventh Amendment Applies Only to the Judicial Branch 
The separation of powers theory also maintains that the 
Eleventh Amendment is not a constitutional limitation on 
Congress‘ power to abrogate sovereign immunity.  According to 
this theory, the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to combat the 
excessive judicial activism of Chisholm, and thus the Amendment 
 
 83 Id. at 538. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 541–42. 
 86 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at § 7.3. 
 87 Field, supra note 82, at 539 (explaining Justice Brennan‘s view that after the 
ratification of Article III sovereign immunity had common law status). 
 88 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 84 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added).  Justice Stevens maintains that his dissent in Seminole is consistent 
with his concurrence in Union Gas.  In that case, the Justice reconciles Hans based not on 
federal common law but on prudential principles of federalism and comity. Cf. 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1989).  On the other hand, in 
Seminole, Justice Souter‘s dissent explains that Hans‘ holding was ―wrongly decided.‖ 
See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 117 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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applies only to the Judiciary and not to Congress.
89
  Reasoning that 
because Article III addresses only judicial power but permits 
Congress to direct that power pursuant to the lawful exercise of its 
Article I powers, and because the Eleventh Amendment is directed 
at clarifying the courts‘ Article III powers, this theory concludes 
that the Amendment can reasonably be said to apply only to the 
courts and not to Congress.
90
  Further, borrowing from Herbert 
Wechsler, the proponents of this theory contend that since 
Congress is composed of members who represent their constituent 
states, Congress is far better suited than the courts to wrestle with 
problems of allocating state and national power.
91
  The greatest 
problems with this theory are: first, the wording of the Amendment 
does not constrict its applicability to the Judiciary only; and 
second, to construe such a narrow focus would make the Eleventh 
Amendment unique as no other amendment is directed exclusively 
at one branch to the exclusion of others. 
III. SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA V. FLORIDA: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
IS A CONSTITUTIONAL BAR. 
The sovereign immunity landscape was dramatically changed 
in 1996 by the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
92
  
Seminole was not an intellectual property case, but a case under the 
Indian Commerce Clause
93
 that, nonetheless, sent shock waves 
through the intellectual property community.  Seminole held that 
Congress has no power whatsoever to abrogate state sovereign 
 
 89 See John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action 
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1441–45 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental 
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in 
Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693–99 (1976).  This excessive 
activism was either the Court‘s enforcement of a state cause of action or the creation of a 
federal cause of action by which litigants could force a state to honor its obligations 
under the Commerce Clause. Nowak, supra, at 1442. 
 90 Tribe, supra note 89, at 693–95. 
 91 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 545, 559–60 (1954). 
 92 517 U.S. 44, 84 (1996). 
93  Id. at 84. 
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immunity under Article I of the United States Constitution.
94
  
Congress gets its power to legislate with respect to copyrights and 
patents by way of Article I, section 8, clause 8,
95
 and its power to 
legislate with respect to trademarks by way of Article I, section 8, 
clause 3 (the Commerce Clause).
96
  Under Seminole, all Article I 
legislation that attempts to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment is 
unconstitutional.
97
 
By a five to four vote, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing the 
majority opinion in which Justices O‘Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas joined, the Court in Seminole endorsed the 
constitutional immunity theory of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, holding that the reach of the Eleventh Amendment 
extends beyond its express language and encompasses a 
constitutional limitation on federal courts‘ Article III powers.98  
The Court did not stop with this broad pronouncement but went 
even further, finding that Congress‘ plenary powers under Article 
I, specifically here the Indian Commerce Clause, did not permit 
Congress to abrogate a state‘s sovereign immunity.99  In reaching 
 
 94 See id. at 76. 
 95 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Clause 8 provides: Congress shall have power ―[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Tımes to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖ 
Id.  The Constitution, at the time of its drafting, used the convention currently used in 
modern German, to capitalize all nouns. See Jochen Muesseler, Monika Nißlein & Asher 
Koriat, German Capitalization of Nouns and the Detection of Letters in Continuous Text, 
59(3) CANADIEN J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 143, 144 (2005). 
 96 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Clause 3 provides as follows: Congress shall have 
power ―[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.‖ Id. 
 97 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 76.  Therefore, the Copyright Reform Act, Patent Reform 
Act, and the Trademark Fair Use Reform Act are not valid legislation.  The result is that 
unless the use of a patent, copyright, or trademark can be classified as a valid ―taking,‖ 
states are free to infringe with impunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 98 See id. at 72–73. 
 99 Id.  The idea is that Article I comes first in time relative to the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The Eleventh Amendment trumps Article I, so any legislation promulgated 
under Article I is invalid.  The Fourteenth Amendment comes after the Eleventh 
Amendment, so legislation promulgated under the Fourteenth Amendment can be 
effective against the Eleventh Amendment.  The logic seems simple, however, by the 
same token, one could then make the argument that all copyright legislation is illegal 
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its conclusion, the Supreme Court overruled Union Gas, which it 
decided in only 1989.
100
  The Court did not adhere to the principle 
of stare decisis, but instead chose to reconsider the precedent set in 
Union Gas.
101
 
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that 
the background principle of state sovereign 
immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is 
not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of 
the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian 
commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the 
Federal Government.  Even when the Constitution 
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority 
over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment 
prevents congressional authorization of suits by 
private parties against unconsenting States.  The 
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power 
under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to 
circumvent the constitutional limitation placed upon 
federal jurisdiction.
102
 
The result of Seminole is that, in many situations, Congress 
cannot provide a federal forum for monetary damages in cases in 
which the state is a defendant, even in the face of flagrant state 
violation of federal law. 
Union Gas did not subscribe to any particular theory to attempt 
to explain Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, but by holding that 
Congress did have authority under the Commerce Clause to 
abrogate a state‘s sovereign immunity as long as the abrogation 
was clear and unequivocal,
103
 the Court necessarily rejected the 
notion of complete constitutional sovereign immunity.
104
  While 
Seminole is unlikely to put to rest the academic debate over the 
 
because the First Amendment came after the drafting of the Copyright and Patent Clause.  
To date, courts have not taken such an extreme stance. 
 100 Id. at 59–73 (discussing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). 
 101 See id. at 63. 
 102 Id. at 72–73. 
 103 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15, 23 (1989). 
 104 See id. at 18. 
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proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, it does, at least 
for the present, solidify the Court‘s position on the Eleventh 
Amendment and Congress‘ Article I powers to abrogate sovereign 
immunity. 
IV. THE EX PARTE YOUNG EXCEPTION 
Even if a suit against a state is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment, the plaintiff might still be granted prospective, 
injunctive relief against a state official under the doctrine of Ex 
parte Young.
105
  The doctrine was borne in the aftermath of 
Reconstruction.  The post-Reconstruction cases had laid waste to 
the Osborn principle, which held that although a state could not be 
haled into court as a defendant, the state‘s officers who perpetrated 
a wrong could be.
106
  For example, in Louisiana ex rel. Elliot v. 
Jumel,
107
 the Court decided that, notwithstanding Osborn, the 
Eleventh Amendment bar against suing a state in federal court 
extended to the state‘s officers as well.108  Jumel and the other 
bondholder suits of the 1880s effectively foreclosed any avenue 
through which one could sue a state.  Like the Eleventh 
Amendment-precipitating Chisholm decision, Jumel also set off 
shockwaves.  In response to Jumel, a constitutional amendment 
repealing the Eleventh Amendment was introduced into 
Congress.
109
  But the Amendment failed, and litigants wishing to 
sue a state were faced with the Eleventh Amendment‘s virtual iron-
clad bar against suit until the 1908 case of Ex parte Young,
110
 
which effectively resurrected Osborn. 
In Ex parte Young, Minnesota‘s Attorney General Edward T. 
Young, was sued by railroad stockholders who sought to enjoin the 
enforcement of a rate ceiling on railroad fares.
111
  The circuit court 
 
 105 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 106 See generally Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 107 107 U.S. 711 (1883). 
 108 See id. at 728. 
 109 ORTH, JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 21, at 70.  The proposed amendment may be 
found at H.R. Res. 321, 47th Cong. (1883).  Debate pertaining to it may be found at 14 
CONG. REC. 1356 (1883). 
 110 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 111 See id. at 126–33. 
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issued a temporary restraining order against Young, and when 
Young enforced the law in violation of the court‘s order he was 
found in contempt of court.
112
  Young petitioned the Supreme 
Court on a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that because he was 
acting under state authority the suit was effectively one against the 
state, and thus expressly prohibited by the Eleventh 
Amendment.
113
  This time, however, the Court found that 
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, the Attorney General 
was subject to suit.
114
  The Court reasoned that when 
[t]he act to be enforced is alleged to be 
unconstitutional; and if it be so, the use of the name 
of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the 
injury of complainants is a proceeding without the 
authority of, and one which does not affect, the state 
in its sovereign or governmental capacity.  It is 
simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official 
in attempting, by the use of the name of the state, to 
enforce a legislative enactment which is void 
because unconstitutional.  If the act which the state 
attorney general seeks to enforce be a violation of 
the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding 
under such enactment, comes into conflict with the 
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in 
that case stripped of his official or representative 
character and is subjected in his person to the 
consequences of his individual conduct.  The state 
has no power to impart to him any immunity from 
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United 
States.
115
 
By reinstating the state official exception to the Eleventh 
Amendment, but on grounds somewhat more logically sound
116
 
 
 112 See id. at 132. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See id. at 167–68. 
 115 Id. at 159–60. 
 116 Ex parte Young is criticized as establishing a false distinction between a state 
official and the state itself—false because, regardless of whether the state or its officer is 
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than Osborn‘s highly formalistic rationale of simply relying on the 
person designated as the opposing party, Ex parte Young yielded 
the same practical result as Osborn: to circumvent the Eleventh 
Amendment a plaintiff must sue not the state but the official 
enforcing the state law.  Recognizing an Eleventh Amendment 
exception that allows states to be enjoined from enforcing 
unconstitutional laws is vital to fulfilling the supremacy clause‘s 
purpose.
117
  Without a means to sanction a state‘s unconstitutional 
behavior, the Constitution becomes nothing more than a guideline. 
There is one great difference that prevents the Ex parte Young 
doctrine from becoming the exception that swallows the rule of 
sovereign immunity: Ex parte Young only applies when suing a 
state officer for prospective, injunctive relief.
118
  Thus, when a suit 
is against a state directly or against a state official, the Eleventh 
Amendment bars the suit, except when, under Ex parte Young, the 
officer is named in his individual capacity and the relief sought is 
not damages, past debt, or retroactive relief.
119
  Ex parte Young 
creates an avenue for forcing a state, through its officers, to 
conform to federal law while also preserving state treasuries—one 
of the main purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 
 
the defendant, the result is that a successful suit results in enjoining the state law; thus, 
the Ex parte Young fiction permits a situation no different than if the state‘s sovereign 
immunity had been abrogated. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at § 7.5.1 (listing 
scholars who criticize Ex parte Young for its fictional qualities); ORTH, JUDICIAL POWER, 
supra note 21, at 131 (noting that ―among legal commentators, especially in later years, 
the case is barely tolerated‖ because of its reliance on a so-called ―legal fiction‖).  A 
second, separate aspect of the Ex parte Young fiction is that the same unconstitutional 
action by the same officer that strips state involvement for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes, creates state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Florida Dep‘t of 
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982); Home Tel. & Tel. v. Los 
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 294 (1913); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at § 7.5.1.  Professor 
Orth, however, argues that the legal fiction is not as great as critics have supposed; the 
plaintiffs in Ex parte Young were in fact suing Attorney General Young for his wrongful 
enforcement and, under a rather strained analogy, like a corporate officer acting ultra 
vires, Young was acting outside the power of the state and thus acting alone. ORTH, 
JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 21, at 132–35. 
 117 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (noting that 
―[o]ur decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Ex parte Young doctrine rests on the 
need to promote the vindication of federal rights‖). 
 118 See id. 
 119 Id. at 105–06. 
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Seminole potentially alters the law surrounding the Ex parte 
Young doctrine.  In Seminole, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
[W]e have often made it clear that the relief sought 
by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the 
question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.  We think it follows a fortiori from 
this proposition that the type of relief sought is 
irrelevant to whether Congress has power to 
abrogate States‘ immunity.  The Eleventh 
Amendment does not exist solely in order to 
―preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be 
paid out of a State‘s treasury‖; it also serves to 
avoid ―the indignity of subjecting a State to the 
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance 
of private parties.‖120 
This makes it clear that simply suing a state official for 
prospective, non-monetary relief instead of damages may not be 
enough to invoke the Ex parte Young exception.  The Seminole 
Tribe of Florida, the plaintiff in Seminole, sued not only the state 
of Florida but also its governor, Lawton Chiles, seeking to force 
the state into good faith negotiations regarding the tribe‘s desire to 
start legalized gambling on their land.
121
  The Seminole majority 
rejected the argument that the suit against Governor Chiles fell 
under the Ex parte Young exception, even though the relief sought 
was not monetary, and dismissed the suit on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds.
122
 
Although the Seminole decision was not written in fact-specific 
language, to understand Seminole‘s potential ramifications on the 
doctrine of Ex parte Young it is helpful to examine the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (―IGRA‖),123 the jurisdiction-granting 
statute in the case.  IGRA provides that Indian tribes may run 
 
 120 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (quoting Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994); P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). 
 121 See id. at 51. 
 122 See id. at 76. 
 123 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). 
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legalized gambling games
124
 only when, among other things, they 
are ―conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact 
entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.‖125  A tribe desiring 
to form a Tribal-State compact must formally request that the state 
enter into negotiations, and ―[u]pon receiving such a request, the 
State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into 
such a compact.‖126  If the state fails to negotiate, or does not 
negotiate in good faith, IGRA grants federal courts the jurisdiction 
to ―order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact 
within a 60-day period.‖127  Should the court-ordered good faith 
negotiations fail to result in a compact, IGRA provides stronger 
remedial action, culminating in a compact forced upon the state by 
the Secretary.
128
 
The Supreme Court nonetheless dismissed the suit against 
Governor Chiles, even though the relief sought was non-
monetary.
129
  Generally, a suit seeking damages against federal 
officers is allowed under a Bivens action, unless ―Congress has 
provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed 
as equally effective.‖130  By applying this logic to the question of 
whether the Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted under the Ex 
parte Young exception, the Court found that ―the same general 
principle applies: . . . where Congress has prescribed a detailed 
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily 
created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those 
limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based 
upon Ex parte Young.‖131  According to the Court, a remedial 
 
 124 The games at issue here were classified as Class III, the most heavily regulated of 
the three possible classes, and included games such as ―slot machines, casino games, 
banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries.‖ Seminole, 517 U.S. at 48. 
 125 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). 
 126 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
 127 Id. § 2710(d)(7) (granting jurisdiction and prescribing a remedial scheme). 
 128 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). 
 129 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 74–75. 
 130 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971). 
 131 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 74. 
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scheme especially cautions against finding an Ex parte Young 
exception when the full statutory remedy, here a compact imposed 
by the executive branch, is less than the ―full remedial powers of a 
federal court, including, presumably, contempt sanctions.‖132 
Expanding this exception to the situation in which the question 
is whether the Eleventh Amendment should completely bar a suit 
regardless of explicit Congressional intent seems rather odd.  
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist termed IGRA‘s sanctions 
―modest,‖133 forcing a state to accept a federally imposed contract 
regulating gambling—a traditional area of state self-regulation—
between itself and another party is in fact a greater imposition than 
finding a state officer, albeit in this case, the governor, in 
contempt.  More fundamentally, if Congress does not have the 
power to impose its detailed remedial scheme directly against a 
state or a state‘s officers because it lacks the power to do so in the 
face of the Eleventh Amendment, why should it matter what the 
remedial scheme is, since it will never be brought to bear?  A 
catch-22 is created: if Congress imposes a remedial scheme, the 
Eleventh Amendment bar will stand, but if the Eleventh 
Amendment bar stands, the remedial scheme will never be 
imposed. 
The Copyright Act permits suit against ―anyone‖ who 
infringes, with ―anyone‖ being defined so as to include ―any State, 
any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a 
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official 
capacity.‖134  The Patent Act uses exactly the same language to 
define the range of permissible defendants, except that it uses the 
word ―whoever‖ instead of anyone.135  Compare the language used 
to define the defendant range in post-Seminole cases challenging 
the applicability of Ex parte Young: both the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act
136
 and the Clean Water Act
137—
 
 132 Id. at 75. 
 133 Id. 
 134 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 135 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2006). 
 136 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); see also Prisco v. New York, 1996 WL 596546, *15–16 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1996) (examining whether statute forecloses an Ex parte Young suit). 
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the latter cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist as an act presumably 
withstanding a claim that Ex parte Young is foreclosed
138—permit 
suit ―against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) 
any other governmental instrumentality).‖139  Similarly, the 
Endangered Species Act permits ―enjoin[ing] any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental 
instrumentality.‖140  These Acts allow suit against any individual, 
including a governmental entity, and in no way limit the type of 
suit maintainable against governmental officials. 
A suit against an officer in his official capacity is considered to 
be actually against the state, and is thus subject to the same 
Eleventh Amendment concerns as is a suit naming the state 
directly.
141
  As an exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar, Ex 
parte Young suits are permissible only against officers in their 
official capacities and only for prospective, injunctive relief.
142
  
The Supreme Court has stated that ―the phrase ‗acting in their 
official capacities‘ is best understood as a reference to the capacity 
in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the 
officer inflicts the alleged injury.‖143  Since Congress set the range 
of defendants to include those officials acting in their official 
capacities, it can be persuasively argued that Congress intended the 
class of defendants to include Ex parte Young suits.
144
  Therefore, 
even though neither the Patent Act nor the Copyright Act permits 
 
 137 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2006); see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep‘t of 
Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996) (examining whether an Ex parte Young action 
is authorized by statute). 
 138 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (1996). 
 139 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006). 
 140 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2006). 
 141 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 
 142 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). 
 143 Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep‘t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 
(1989)). 
 144 In the Ex parte Young action against Georgia State University, the plaintiffs named 
the University President, the Head Librarian, and other individuals, as the defendants, not 
the University. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE (N.D. Ga. 
Sept. 30, 2010) (holding that, as an entity, Georgia State is not capable of determining 
fair use nor of copying or reproducing materials that are copyrighted). 
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citizen-suits, under Seminole, Congress did seem to intend to allow 
Ex parte Young suits.
145
 
Even if the Court determines that Ex parte Young suits are 
allowed against state officials who allegedly infringe copyright or 
patent rights, such a remedy falls far short of making the 
intellectual property owner whole.  Injunctions are prospective 
relief and can guard only against future infringements, thus they do 
nothing to remedy the past injury that initially justified the 
injunction.  Further, there is no compensation for lost market share, 
an important consideration in the computer industry where a 
company often releases several upgraded versions within a single 
product line.  In the ephemeral world of computer hardware and 
software, an injunction may be especially ill-suited to remedying 
infringement; by the time the infringement is detected and an 
injunction issued, the product may be obsolete.
146
  Unlike the one-
time collection of damages, enforcing an injunction entails 
ongoing monitoring to ensure compliance.
147
  Without the ability 
to seek monetary compensation, the cost of procuring and 
enforcing an injunction can be prohibitively expensive, especially 
for the many small software companies.  Finally, unlike a 
judgment against a state, an Ex parte Young injunction is specific 
to the state official, so should another, unnamed official begin 
infringing, a second injunction must be sought.
148
  All said, an 
injunction is a poor substitute for recovery of monetary damages 
against a state that infringes a copyright or patent. 
 
 
 145 It could be argued that Congress intended all suits against States, by passing the 
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (―CRCA‖) and the Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act (―PRCA‖), but Seminole restricted the coverage of 
them. 
 146 See, e.g., THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT 
LIABILITY OF STATES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 14 (1988) (noting that injunctions 
are of lesser value in area of short-lived music). 
 147 See id. at 15. 
 148 See id. 
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V. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 
A. Initial History 
From 1790 to 1962, no court dismissed a suit for alleged 
intellectual property infringement by a state on Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity grounds.
149
  An individual was 
free to recover damages from a state that was guilty of copyright, 
patent, or trademark infringement.  Then in 1962, a copyright 
infringement action against an Iowa school district was dismissed 
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction 
under the Eleventh Amendment.
150
  No other circuit court at the 
time had reached that conclusion.
151
   
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon dismissed an employment discrimination case because 
Congress had not provided the requisite ―unequivocal statutory 
language‖ in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 necessary to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity;
152
 general authorizing language was 
insufficient.
153
  The Court held that federal statutes purporting to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity must clearly express Congress‘ 
intent to provide a remedy for individuals filing suit against a 
state.
154
  Legislation containing general language such as 
―anyone,‖ or ―whoever,‖ was not enough.  Congress had to be 
specifically clear that a state could and would be a party to the 
litigation. 
 
 149 Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 12 (2002) (statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity 
Hearing].  The Copyright Act of 1790 made ―any person‖ liable for damages as a result 
of copyright infringement. 1 Stat. 124 (§ 6) (1790). 
 150 See Sovereign Immunity Hearing, supra note 149, at 12 (citing Wihtol v. Crow, 309 
F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 1962)). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985)). 
 153 Id. at 246. 
 154 Id. at 242. 
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For example, in BV Engineering v. University of California,
155
 
a pre-Seminole, pre-Copyright Remedy Clarification Act 
(―CRCA‖) case made famous because it highlighted the need for 
clear congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity with 
regard to copyright laws, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eleventh 
Amendment immunized the state from suit even though no other 
remedy was available.
156
  The court held that under current law, it 
was up to Congress to abrogate state immunity with clear 
―unequivocal‖ language, and until Congress did so ―states [may] 
violate the federal copyright laws with virtual impunity.‖157  
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed CRCA.
158
 
Congress, however, was a little shortsighted, and did not 
realize that the same problem would emerge in patent and 
trademark litigation.
159
  Highlighting this oversight, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Atascadero in Chew v. 
California, held that the Patent Act did not contain the ―requisite 
unmistakable language of congressional intent necessary to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.‖160  After the Federal 
Circuit decided Chew, Congress realized its error and passed the 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (―TRCA‖),161 and the Patent 
and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act 
(―PRCA‖).162  Along with CRCA, language within these acts 
specifically and unequivocally abrogated state sovereign immunity 
and subjected the states to suits for monetary damages brought by 
individuals for violation of federal copyright, trademark, or patent 
law. 
 
 155 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989). 
 156 See id. at 1400. 
 157 Id. 
 158 17 U.S.C. § 511 (2006). 
 159 See Michael B. Landau, Sovereign Immunity and United States Patent and 
Copyright Law, 7 INTELL. PROP. J. 204, 205 (1992).  For two years, states were fully 
liable for copyright infringement and fully immune from liability for patent infringement. 
 160 893 F.2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 161 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (2006). 
 162 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2006). 
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B. The Florida Prepaid Cases 
In 1999, following Seminole, and concerned about sovereign 
immunity‘s application to the intellectual property laws, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on two companion cases out of 
the Third and Federal Circuits.  College Savings Bank had a patent 
for its college financing method, which would provide the investor 
guaranteed funds for college at maturity.
163
  Florida appropriated 
the methodology and issued investments to its residents under the 
name Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board 
(―Board‖).164  In response to the Board‘s action, College Savings 
Bank filed an action with two separate claims against the Board, 
seeking among other things, money damages.
165
  The first claim 
was for patent infringement; the second claim was for false and 
misleading advertising.
166
  Ultimately, the cases were split with the 
patent case going to the Federal Circuit on appeal and then to the 
Supreme Court and the false advertising case going to the Third 
Circuit on appeal and then to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme 
Court cases will be analyzed in turn, with the majority of the 
analysis focused on the patent case. 
In Florida Prepaid I, the patentee brought an action against a 
state agency for patent infringement of a patented apparatus and 
method for administering a college investment program.
167
  The 
United States intervened in favor of the patent holder.
168
  The 
District Court denied the Board‘s motion to dismiss,169 and the 
Federal Circuit affirmed.
170
  In its holding, the Federal Circuit 
found that Congress had expressly stated its ―intent to abrogate 
States‘ immunity from suit in federal court for patent infringement, 
and that Congress had the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
 
 163 Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 630–31. 
 164 Id. at 631. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See generally Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 948 F.Supp. 
400 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 167 Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 631. 
 168 Id. at 633. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
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Amendment to do so.‖171  The court continued that ―patents are 
property subject to the protections of the Due Process Clause,‖172 
and Congress legislated to prevent what was, in essence, states 
taking a license without compensating the patent holder.
173
  
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the legislation was a 
―proportionate response‖ to prevent the ―significant harm [that] 
results from state infringement of patents.‖174  The court 
concluded, ―[t]here is no sound reason that Congress cannot 
subject a state to the same civil consequences that face a private 
party infringer.‖175  The Supreme Court reversed, by the same split 
that they decided Seminole.
176
 
Justice Rehnquist held that congressional intent to abrogate 
sovereign immunity from patent claims was unmistakably clear,
177
 
but neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause of the 
Constitution provided Congress with the valid authority to 
abrogate.
178
  The Fourteenth Amendment‘s authorization for 
appropriate legislation to protect against ―deprivation[s] of 
property without due process‖179 did not provide Congress with 
authority to abrogate sovereign immunity under PRCA.
180
 
The Court reached its decision that the Fourteenth 
Amendment
181
 was not violated, despite the state having used the 
 
 171 Id.  
 172 Id. 
 173 See id. 
 174 Id. at 634. 
 175 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 176 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O‘Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were 
in the majority; Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were in the minority. 
Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996).  The same alignment decided the trademark case in the Supreme Court with the 
same parties. Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 177 Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 635. 
 178 Id. at 636. 
 179 Id. at 643. 
 180 Id. at 647–48. 
 181 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant 
part: ―No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
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patent without compensating the patent holder.  The Court 
reasoned:  
[I]n enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, 
Congress identified no pattern of infringement by 
the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional 
violations. . . .  The House Report . . . could provide 
only two examples of patent infringement suits 
against the States.  The Federal Circuit in its 
opinion identified only eight patent-infringement 
suits prosecuted against the States in the 110 years 
between 1880 and 1990.
182
 
The court noted that ―Congress, however, barely considered the 
availability of state remedies for patent infringement.‖183  State 
remedies are few and far between, for 28 U.S.C. § 1338 expressly 
states that, ―[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.  Such 
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, 
plant variety protection and copyright cases.‖184 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, further discussed the history of 
federal jurisdiction: 
The Constitution vests Congress with plenary 
authority over patents and copyrights.  Nearly 200 
years ago, Congress provided for exclusive 
jurisdiction of patent infringement litigation in the 
federal courts. . . . Given the absence of effective 
state remedies for patent infringement . . . [the 
Patent Remedy Act] was an appropriate exercise of 
Congress‘ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prevent state deprivations of 
property without due process of law.
185
 
 
 182 Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 640 (citations omitted). 
 183 Id. at 628. 
 184 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (emphasis added). 
 185 527 U.S. at 648–49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Campbell v. 
City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 620 (1895). 
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He noted that in Chew v. California,
186
 the case that led 
Congress to pass PRCA, the lack of ability to pursue a state 
remedy was paramount in its decision to legislate to abrogate 
sovereign immunity.
187
  There was also testimony in the aftermath 
of Chew by Professor Robert Merges stating that the plaintiff 
might not be able to draft her complaint as a tort claim: ―This 
might be impossible, o[r] at least difficult under California law.  
Consequently, relief under [state statutes] may not be a true 
alternative avenue of recovery.‖188  Justice Stevens also noted that 
―this court has never mandated that Congress must find 
‗widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights‘ in 
order to employ its § 5 authority.‖189 
The other case, Florida Prepaid II,
190
 dealt with false 
advertising under the Lanham Act.  The Court, too, held that 
Congress had no power to abrogate sovereign immunity under 
Article I.
191
  As for the false advertising claim, the majority held 
that the Due Process Clause protected neither of the interests 
advanced by the petitioners: ―(1) a right to be free from a business 
competitor‘s false advertising about its own product, and (2) a 
 
 186 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 187 Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 655. 
 188 Id. at 655–56 (quoting Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 33 (1990) (statement of Robert Merges)).  Merges 
continued,  
Another problem with this approach is that it assumes that such state 
law remedies will be available in every state in which the patentee‘s 
product will be sold.  This may or may not be true.  In any event, 
requiring a potential plaintiff (patent) to ascertain the validity of her 
claims under then differing substantive and prcedural law of the fifty 
states may well prove to be a vary substantial disincentive to the 
commencement of such suits.  Moreover it would vitiate a major goal 
of the federal intellectual property system: national uniformity.  In 
short, these remedies are simply no substitute for patent infringement 
actions.  
Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st 
Cong. 33, 33–34 (1990) (statement of Robert Merges) [hereinafter House Hearings]. 
 189 Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 660 (citation omitted). 
 190 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 191 Id. at 693. 
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more generalized right to be secure in one‘s business interests.‖192  
The Court also overruled Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama 
Docks Department
193
 eliminating any defense based upon waiving 
sovereign immunity by participating in federally regulated 
activities.
194
  Justice Stevens again dissented, claiming ―the activity 
of doing business . . . is a form of property,‖195 and there should be 
deference to Congress in its decision to abrogate sovereign 
immunity.
196
  Justice Breyer also vehemently dissented as to the 
Court‘s overruling of Parden.197 
Following the Supreme Court cases, the Fifth Circuit decided 
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press.
198
  The plaintiff in Chavez brought a 
claim under CRCA against a state university and one of its 
employees.
199
  The court, like the Florida Prepaid Court, found 
that CRCA would be an invalid exercise of power under Article I 
legislative power.
200
  The court then addressed whether CRCA was 
a valid abrogation of states‘ sovereign immunity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
201
  In finding no valid abrogation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Chavez Court noted, as the 
Florida Prepaid Court did, that, ―the record does not indicate that 
Congress was responding to the kind of massive constitutional 
violations that have prompted proper remedial legislation.‖ 202 
Suffice it to say, there was great disagreement over the two 
Florida Prepaid cases.  The Eleventh Amendment was not a bar to 
intellectual property cases under Article I until the late 1980s—and 
that was just a temporary glitch to provide the states with clear and 
unequivocal language.  It is truly new law to say that Congress has 
no power under Article I to abrograte considering that there was no 
 
 192 Id. at 672. 
 193 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 194 Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. at 682. 
 195 Id. at 693. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See id. at 693–99. 
 198 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 199 Id. at 603–04. 
 200 Id. at 604. 
 201 See id. at 604–08. 
 202 Id. at 607. 
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bar to intellectual property cases for over 200 years.  It is hard to 
believe the Court‘s assertion that no pattern of infringement exists. 
C. There is Now a Pattern of Infringement of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
In Florida Prepaid I, the Supreme Court held that Congress, in 
enacting PRCA, did not have the authority to abrogate the states‘ 
sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims.
203
  The 
Court applied the test from Seminole and asked, ―whether 
Congress has ‗unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the 
immunity,‘ . . . and second, whether Congress has acted ‗pursuant 
to a valid exercise of power.‘‖204  After finding that Congress had 
clearly intended to abrogate, the Court moved on to address 
whether Congress had the authority to do so.
205
 
The Court first determined that under Seminole, Congress 
could not abrogate the states‘ sovereign immunity under Article I 
powers.  The Court then turned to the question of whether 
―Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to secure the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s protections against deprivations of property without 
due process of law.‖206  To do so, the Court determined that PRCA 
would need to be viewed as a remedial measure enacted to ensure 
Fourteenth Amendment violations against patent owners.
207
 
To be remedial in nature, Congress would need to have enacted 
PRCA in response to unremedied state infringement of patents.
208
  
The Court, however, found that there was not enough evidence of 
such patent claims against states because ―[t]he Federal Circuit . . . 
identified only eight patent-infringement suits prosecuted against 
the States in the 110 years between 1880 and 1990.‖209  The Court 
found that this ―handful‖ of suits did ―not respond to a history of 
‗widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights‘ of 
 
 203 See Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999). 
 204 Id. at 635 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)). 
 205 See id. at 635–48. 
 206 Id. at 636. 
 207 See id. at 639–43. 
 208 See id. at 640.  
 209 Id.  
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the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 
legislation.‖210 
Although the Court could only cite to a ―handful‖ of cases in 
its 1999 Florida Prepaid decisions, many more patent 
infringement claims against states have transpired in the 
intervening 12 years.  Within two months, the Nevada District 
Court dismissed patent infringement claims against Nevada 
agencies based on sovereign immunity in Progressive Games, Inc. 
v. Shuffle Master, Inc.
211
  In 2001, the Federal Circuit upheld the 
state‘s sovereign immunity from alleged patent infringement 
claims brought by highway construction corporations in State 
Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. State of Florida.
212
  The 
Southern District Court of Texas even dismissed a correction of 
inventorship suit against an arm of the state based on sovereign 
immunity grounds in Xechem International, Inc. v. University of 
Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center.
213
  Multiple cases involving 
courts granting state actors sovereign immunity in patent 
infringement suits followed.
214
  There might not have been a 
 
 210 Id. at 645–46 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)). 
 211 69 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1275 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 212 State Contracting & Eng‘g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 213  No. H-02-1013, 2003 WL 24232747, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
 214 See generally A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(finding that the State university had not waived its sovereign immunity in the patent 
infringement suit); Baum Research & Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Mass. at Lowell, 53 F.3d 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the State university had waived its sovereign immunity in a 
patent infringement suit against it); Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal. Dep‘t of 
Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the State had not waived its 
sovereign immunity in a patent infringement suit against the State and a State agency); 
Vas-Cath, Inc., v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that 
State university had waived its sovereign immunity from private party‘s appeal of an 
interference proceeding initiated by the university); Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce 
Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding the State university was immune 
from the patent infringement suit brought by private party); Tegic Commc‘ns Corp. v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (relying on 
Florida Prepaid in finding that, ―the Court has confirmed the applicability of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to suits pertaining to violations of federal patent and trademark 
laws,‖ during suit brought by private party against State university system for a 
declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability);  Competitive Techs., Inc. v. 
Fujitsu Ltd., 374 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding a State university had waived its 
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pattern found at the time of the Florida Prepaid cases, but there 
most certainly is a pattern of abuse now.  The actual number of 
controversies is far larger; most violations do not go to trial, they 
settle. 
All areas of intellectual property law have seen a pattern of 
states infringing private parties‘ intellectual property rights.  Many 
post-Florida Prepaid cases concerning states‘ sovereign immunity 
with respect to copyright claims followed the Fifth Circuit‘s 
decision in Chavez.
215
  After the Chavez court noted the lack of 
constitutional violations caused by states using private parties‘ 
copyrighted materials, at least eleven more courts applied the 
Chavez rationale to uphold states‘ sovereign immunity from 
copyright claims against state actors.
216
 Without explicitly 
 
sovereign immunity for invalidity, non-infringement, and unenforceability 
counterclaims); Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions, Inc., 2010 WL 
2243727 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (finding the State actors exempt from a finding of direct 
infringement based on sovereign immunity in a suit against a third party for inducing 
infringement). 
 215 See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 216 See generally Whipple v. Utah, 2011 WL 4368568 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2011) 
(adopting the Chavez court‘s reasoning in determining that State actors had immunity 
from copyright infringement suit by private parties); Campinha-Bacote v. Bleidt, 2011 
WL 679913 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2011) (following the reasoning from Chavez in 
determining that the State university was entitled to a dismissal of the copyright 
infringement claims based on sovereign immunity); Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & 
Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (following the Chavez Court‘s 
holding that the abrogation of State sovereign immunity by the CRCA was invalid); 
Wilcox v. Career Step, L.L.C., 2010 WL 4968263 (D. Utah Dec. 1, 2010) (following 
Chavez in determining that the CRCA did not abrogate States‘ sovereign immunity from 
copyright infringement claims); Parker v. Dufresne, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64481 (W.D. 
La. May 18, 2010) (dismissing all copyright infringement claims against University 
pursuant based on reasoning from Chavez); Romero v. Cal. Dep‘t of Transp., 2009 WL 
650629 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (agreeing with the Chavez Court that Congress had 
found no substantial evidence of copyright infringement by States in holding that the 
CRCA did not abrogate States‘ sovereign immunity); Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (agreeing with 
the Chavez Court‘s application of the analytical framework from Florida Prepaid in 
determining that the CRCA was not a valid exercise of Congress‘ power); InfoMath, Inc. 
v. Univ. of Ark., 633 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (following the Chavez Court in 
determining that the CRCA was an improper exercise of congressional legislative 
powers); De Romero v. Inst. of Puerto Rican Culture, 466 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D.P.R. 2006) 
(finding the CRCA to not be a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity in part because of 
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following the Chavez court‘s reasoning, several other courts also 
found in favor of state sovereign immunity in copyright cases.
217
  
There have also been Ex parte Young actions against the state 
employees instead of the states.
218
 
Courts have addressed multiple trademark infringement suits 
against states in the twelve years since Florida Prepaid II.  In 
2000, the district court in McGuire v. Regents of the University of 
Michigan found that the state had waived its sovereign immunity 
in a trademark infringement claim against a state actor.
219
  Also in 
2000, the Southern District of New York relied on the Florida 
Prepaid decisions to dismiss counterclaims of trademark invalidity 
against the Idaho Potato Commission.
220
  The court in Board of 
Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Phoenix Software 
International, Inc. relied on the ―scant record‖ of trademark 
infringement by states that Congress might have been trying to 
correct.
221
 
As stated earlier, it is not simply enough to cite Florida 
Prepaid for the proposition that there is not a pattern of 
 
the lack of evidence of widespread copyright infringement by the States); Hairston v. 
N.C. Agric. & Technical State Univ., 2005 WL 2136923 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (following the 
Chavez Court in finding the CRCA not to be a valid abrogation of States‘ sovereign 
immunity); Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(dismissing copyright infringement action against State actors under sovereign 
immunity). 
 217 See, e.g., Nat‘l Ass‘n of Bd. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 
633 F.3d 1297, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the NABP could not identify an actual 
violation of due process that would support Congress‘ abrogation of States‘ sovereign 
immunity in the CRCA); Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm‘n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 281 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (adopting the reasoning from Florida Prepaid in finding that the CRCA did 
not validly abrogate States‘ sovereign immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Williams v. Univ. of Ga. Athletics Dep‘t, No. 3:10-CV-81, 2010 WL 5350170, at *2 
(M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2010) (following the National Ass’n of Boards of Pharmacy court 
decision that copyright infringement claims against state actors are barred by sovereign 
immunity). 
 218 See supra notes 31 & 145. 
 219 McGuire v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., No. 2:99CV1231, 2000 WL 1459435, at 
*4–5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2000). 
 220 Idaho Potato Comm‘n v. M & M Produce Farms & Sales, 95 F. Supp. 2d 150, 155–
56 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 221 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Software Int‘l, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 2d 
1007, 1012 (W.D. Wis. 2008). 
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infringement.  The courts should, and must, look to the present, not 
the past, and conclude that as of today, there is indeed a pattern of 
infringement that needs remediation.  A use of a copyright, patent, 
or trademark by the U.S. government without authorization of the 
license owner is an ―eminent domain taking of a license,‖ in which 
the sole remedy is monetary damages.
222
 
Although the Supreme Court in the Florida Prepaid cases 
denied the Fourteenth Amendment takings claim by claiming that 
there was not a pattern, by 2012 it is disingenuous to say that there 
is not.  There may have been only eight cases in the 110 years 
before the Florida Prepaid cases, but there have been numerous 
patent, trademark, and copyright cases in the years following that 
decision.  There might not have been a pattern then, but there is 
one now.  States should be made to pay for infringement of 
intellectual property. 
 
VI. BANKRUPTCY LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 
Although some courts have held that bankruptcy law creates 
privileges and immunities,
223
 which Congress may protect by 
abrogating state sovereign immunity under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,
224
 most courts have previously viewed 
bankruptcy claims as arising solely under the Article I Bankruptcy 
Clause,
225
 which does not allow Congress to abrogate state 
immunity.
226
  Then the Supreme Court decided Central Virginia 
Community College v. Katz,
227
 a 2006 case that may have altered 
the playing field; but first, a little history. 
 
 222 Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166 (Ct. Cl. 1980); see also, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1498(a), 1498(b) (2006). 
 223 See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 224 See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5. 
 225 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 226 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 & n.16 (1996). 
 227 546 U.S. 356, 377–78 (2006) (concluding that the ―States agreed . . . not to assert 
any sovereign immunity defense they might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to 
‗Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.‘‖ (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 
501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))). 
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In In the Matter of Estate of Fernandez,
228
 the Fifth Circuit 
applied state immunity to a land dispute claim filed in bankruptcy 
court against the state of Louisiana by a judgment creditor of a 
bankrupt developer.
229
  The court held that Seminole precluded 
citizens from suing states under Article I legislation.
230
  Further, 
the court rejected the plaintiff‘s argument that, unlike the 
Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause contains ―an affirmative 
requirement of uniformity‖ and therefore abrogation should be 
allowed.
231
  The court held that uniformity was irrelevant to 
Congress‘ power to abrogate state immunity, and that geographic 
uniformity is maintained by applying sovereign immunity 
uniformly in bankruptcy proceedings.
232
 
The court also rejected arguments that abrogation in 
bankruptcy law was required to protect due process property 
interests and that it protected the ―privilege‖ of having a uniform 
system of bankruptcy.
233
  Finding no evidence that the Act in 
question was specifically passed to enforce Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, the court held that abrogating state immunity 
under some general or vague invocation of section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would make Eleventh Amendment 
immunity meaningless and upset the federal balance of power.
234
  
In its amended opinion, the court also held that a private successor 
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) could not 
 
 228 123 F.3d 241, 242–45, amended on denial of reh’g, 130 F.3d 1138 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 229 See id. at 242–43.  The facts of the case, not really relevant to this decision, state 
that Fernandez bought some land in the name of a general partnership, but that the 
partnership did not exist at the time of the transaction. See id. at 242.  Thereafter, the 
partnership was formed and eventually sold the land to the State of Louisiana. See id. at 
242–43.  When Fernandez declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy,  a creditor brought the state 
into the bankruptcy proceeding, claiming that the partnership had never owned the land, 
so Louisiana did not legitimately purchase the land and instead it belonged to the now 
bankrupt Fernandez. See id. at 243.  The bankruptcy trustee and the judgment creditor 
both appealed the district court‘s decision to dismiss the state from suit. See id. 
 230 See id. at 243–44. 
 231 Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 243; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. 
 232 See Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244. 
 233 See id. at 245; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 234 See Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245. 
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―avoid the Eleventh Amendment by slipping into the shoes of the 
United States.‖235 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in In re Light,
236
 dismissed 
plaintiff‘s claim for damages against the California State Bar, an 
arm of the state.
237
 The California Bar allegedly violated the 
bankruptcy court‘s automatic stay by requiring the plaintiff, a 
Chapter 7 debtor, to pay pre-petition bar dues in order to obtain 
active status in the Bar.
238
  In a non-published decision, the court 
held that although the relevant bankruptcy statute clearly meant to 
abrogate states‘ sovereign immunity,239 Congress did not have the 
power to abrogate immunity through the Bankruptcy Code because 
Seminole limited abrogation to congressional acts passed pursuant 
to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
240
 
 As in Fernandez, arguments that the Bankruptcy Clause 
uniformity requirement distinguishes bankruptcy from other 
Article I powers—in the realm of sovereign immunity—have 
failed in both the Third and Fourth Circuits.
241
  In In re Creative 
Goldsmiths of Washington D.C., Inc.,
242
 the Fourth Circuit held 
that the Bankruptcy Clause should not be treated differently from 
other Article I powers—which do not contain a requirement of 
―uniform laws‖ 243—for Eleventh Amendment purposes, relying on 
Justice Marshall‘s dissent in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department 
of Income Maintenance.
244
  The court held that Congress lacked 
 
 235 See In re Estate of Fernandez, 130 F.3d 1138, 1138 (5th Cir. 1997).  States‘ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not protect them from suits brought by the federal 
government. See id. 
 236 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Light v. State Bar of Cal., 519 U.S. 1123 
(1997). 
 237 See id. at 1320. 
 238 See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
 239 The Bankruptcy Code‘s abrogation provision may be found at 11 U.S.C. § 106. 
 240 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59, 66 (1996); In re Light, 87 
F.3d at 1320. 
 241 See In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998); In re 
Creative Goldsmiths of D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 242 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 243 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 244 492 U.S. 96 (1989); see Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1145–46 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (―I see no reason to treat Congress‘ power under the Bankruptcy Clause any 
differently [than the Commerce Clause power] . . . for both constitutional provisions give 
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the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in conjunction 
with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, because the Act was 
passed pursuant to Article I authority, and there was no evidence 
that it was authorized under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or that it ―sought to preserve the core values 
specifically enumerated‖ in the Fourteenth Amendment.245 
 Similarly, in In re Sacred Heart Hospital of Norristown,
246
 the 
Third Circuit rejected arguments that (1) the Bankruptcy Clause 
should be treated differently than other Article I provisions 
because of its uniformity requirement, and (2) the bankruptcy 
statute‘s abrogation provision is a valid exercise of Congress‘ 
enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
247
  Additionally, the Seminole holding applied only to 
the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses and not to other 
Article I powers.
248
  The court, like the Fernandez court, held that 
the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause requires 
geographic uniformity, and that applying sovereign immunity 
consistently to all parties in a bankruptcy proceeding would satisfy 
the uniformity requirement.
249
 
Further, the circuit court held that Congress could not abrogate 
state immunity through the bankruptcy statute.
250
  The court could 
find no evidence to suggest that the abrogation provision was 
passed pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
251
  
Moreover, the court rejected the notion that bankruptcy is a 
privilege or immunity that could be protected through Congress‘ 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, because the Supreme 
Court previously issued a holding that ―there is no constitutional 
right to a bankruptcy discharge.‖252  The court held that, after the 
 
Congress plenary power over national economic activity.‖) (quoting Hoffman v. Conn. 
Income Maint. Dep‘t, 492 U.S. 96, 111 (1989)). 
 245 Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1147. 
 246 133 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 247 See id. at 243. 
 248 See id.  
 249 See id.; Fernandez v. PNL Asset Mgmt., 123 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 250 In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 251 Id. at 244. 
 252 Id. at 244–45 (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)). 
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Seminole decision, Congress may not abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in legislation passed pursuant to Article I 
powers.
253
  Therefore, Congress lacked the power to abrogate state 
immunity through the bankruptcy statute.
254
 
All of the cases listed above were Courts of Appeals decisions.  
Less than a decade later, in 2006, these holdings were questioned 
when the Supreme Court heard Central Virginia Community 
College v. Katz.
255
  The Court issued a holding that was different 
from the post-Seminole lower court cases, and brought about new 
questions relating to the application of state sovereign immunity.  
The Court held that in ratifying the Constitution, States waived 
sovereign immunity as a defense to bankruptcy suits.
256
  The Court 
stated, ―[i]n ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the States acquiesced 
in a subordination of whatever sovereign immunity they might 
otherwise have asserted in proceedings.‖257 
Relying on original intent and the legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, the Court reasoned that the Framers‘ concerns 
over a uniform bankruptcy system, which gave rise to the 
Bankruptcy Clause in Article I, section 8, superseded state 
sovereign immunity in that area.
258
  The Katz Court did not 
validate the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the 
Article I Bankruptcy Clause, relying instead on historical waiver 
pertaining only to bankruptcy.  The impact on intellectual property 
is therefore unclear.  But it is the first case in which there is a 
limitation on the supremacy of sovereign immunity over Congress‘ 
Article I, section 8 powers.  However, in the case, the Court issued 
 
 253 Id. at 243; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996). 
 254 See Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d at 245. 
 255 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 256 Id. at 377. 
 257 Id. at 378. 
 258 See id. at 377 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4) (―The ineluctable conclusion 
then, is that States agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign 
immunity defense they might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to ‗Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies.‘‖). 
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a holding limited to bankruptcy cases;
259
 it did not address 
intellectual property.
260
 
Despite the fact that the Katz case did not directly involve 
intellectual property, it may have had an influence on it.  If a state 
has waived sovereign immunity by agreeing to a uniform code of 
bankruptcy that was federal in nature, so, too, a state should have 
waived state sovereign immunity with respect to copyrights and 
patents.  The United States Code provides in pertinent part, ―[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety 
protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be 
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety 
protection and copyright cases.‖261  Exclusive means exclusive, 
unless of course courts ignore the literal language of the statute as 
they have done with the Eleventh Amendment ever since they 
decided Hans. 
 
VII. LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO GET AROUND SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 
In the years after the Florida Prepaid cases, there were 
attempts by Congress to rectify the situation.  Representatives 
Lamar Smith and Howard Coble and Senator Patrick Leahy each 
 
 259 See generally James F. Caputo, Copy-Katz: Sovereign Immunity, The Intellectual 
Property Clause, and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 95 GEO. L.J. 1911 
(2007). 
 260 It is interesting to note that the swing vote was Justice O‘Connor, who had voted to 
uphold sovereign immunity in Seminole, Florida Prepaid I, and Florida Prepaid II; Chief 
Justice Roberts took the same position that his predecessor Chief Justice Rehnquist took 
in those cases. See id. 
 261 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  This idea that states are included as 
defendants is not a new idea.  In Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., the court said, ―[t]he entire 
structure of the patent laws is meant to provide a national, uniform system to provide the 
most meaningful protection for the inventor.  Also, in granting to Congress the right to 
create exclusive patents, the states largely surrendered their sovereignty over patents.‖ 
372 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974); see also Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 
1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (―[W]e believe it is clear that the abrogtion of a state‘s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is inherent in the Copyright and Patent Clause and the 
Copyright Act.‖). 
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introduced the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act 
(―IPPRA‖) in their respective chambers.262 
The legislation would have prevented a state from recovering 
for copyright, patent, and trademark infringements unless the state 
had previously waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and 
consented to suit under federal intellectual property law.
263
  There 
were other provisions that would have enabled a person to sue a 
state official in his or her individual capacity for violations of 
federal intellectual property law.
264
  Further, IPPRA included a 
provision that seemed to address the Fourteenth Amendment 
concern.
265
  The legislation never made it out of committee; to 
date, it has not been reintroduced. 
Congress should play hardball with the states.  Instead of 
relying on the states to waive their sovereign immunity in advance, 
Congress should flex its muscle through its spending power.  It 
should condition the waiver of state sovereign immunity on the 
receipt of all educational funds.  There certainly is a sufficient 
nexus between educational funds at all levels and patents and 
copyrights. 
The Constitution empowers Congress to ―lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States.‖266  Congress has the power to ―attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 
‗to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of 
federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal 
statutory and administrative directives.‘‖267  However, the 
 
 262 The legislation was introduced in four different years. S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003); 
H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2031, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1611, 107th Cong. 
(2001); H.R. 3204, 107th Cong. (2001) S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 263 See H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003). 
 264 See id. § 4. 
 265 See id. § 5. 
 266 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 267 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). 
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spending power is limited; it must be exercised pursuant to the 
general welfare.
268
 
In South Dakota v. Dole, the receipt of federal highway funds 
was conditioned upon the State adopting a drinking age of twenty-
one.
269
  South Dakota sued the Secretary of the Department of 
Transportation, claiming that the withholding of funds until it 
acquiesced was a violation of the constitutional limitation on the 
spending power.
270
  Both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals dismissed the complaint.
271
  The Supreme Court held that 
the condition was a valid use of the spending power, noting: 
[A] Presidential commission appointed to study 
alcohol-related accidents and fatalities on the 
Nation‘s highways concluded that the lack of 
uniformity in the States‘ drinking ages created ―an 
incentive to drink and drive‖ because ―young 
persons commut[e] to border States where the 
drinking age is lower.‖  By enacting § 158, 
Congress conditioned the receipt of federal funds in 
a way reasonably calculated to address this 
particular impediment to a purpose for which the 
funds are expended.
272
 
So, too, the spending power can be used in this case.  All levels 
of education—elementary, middle, secondary, college, graduate, 
and post-graduate—are even more related to copyrights and 
patents than the 21-year old drinking age was to highway funds.  
After all, the Constitution provides, ―[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.‖273  While states might not like it, I am 
certain that such an argument would be upheld if proffered.
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 268  Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937)). 
 269 See id. at 205. 
 270 Id. 
 271 South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1986), aff’d,  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 272 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (quoting PRESIDENTIAL COMM‘N ON DRUNK 
DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 11 (1983)). 
 273 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 274 Other commentators have suggested that conditioning waiver of sovereign immunity 
under Congress‘ Spending Clause powers may be a good option. See Jennifer Cotner, 
How the Spending Clause Can Solve the Dilemma of State Sovereign Immunity from 
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In any event, Congress should specify the violations and 
expressly use the Fourteenth Amendment in drafting a new 
provision of the statute.  I propose the following addition to 28 
U.S.C. § 1338: 
(d) To stop the flagrant violations of the federal 
patent, copyright, and trademark laws,
275 
and to 
prevent the taking of a license in patent, copyright, 
 
Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713, 723–41 (describing ways in which 
Congress can force states to waive their sovereign immunity through the exercise of its 
spending power); Matthew Paik, Sovereign Immunity and Patent Infringement Ten Years 
After Florida Prepaid, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 919–20 (2009).  In suggesting ways around 
sovereign immunity, Paik notes that ―because there have been more patent infringement 
cases involving states since the Florida Prepaid cases, it will be easier for Congress to 
make its findings that this is a problem deserving of a remedy.‖ Id. at 923–24. 
 275 Congress could put the following cases in the legislative history, include them 
within the statute itself, or both.  While it is a stretch to put the cases in the statute itself, 
the Court needs to know that there is a pattern of infringement that needs fixing fast.  The 
cases are illustrated by the following: Nat‘l Ass‘n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents 
of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011); A123 Sys. v. Hydro-Quebec, 
626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Baum Research & Dev. Co. v. University of Mass., 503 
F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal. Dep‘t of Health 
Servs., 505 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Vas-Cath, Inc., v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 
473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Tegic Commc‘ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 
299, 457 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm‘n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 
279 (5th Cir. 2000); Campinha-Bacote v. Bleidt, No. H-10-3481, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12604 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2011); Whipple v. Utah, No. 2:10-CV-811-DAK, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 109630 (D. Utah Aug 24, 2011); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 
1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142236 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2010); Jacobs v. 
Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); Parker 
v. Dufresne, No. 09-cv-1859, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64481 (W.D. La. May 18, 2010); Voter 
Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys., No. 6:09-cv-1969-Orl-19KRS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26509 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2010); Wilcox v. Career Step, No. 2:08-CV-998 CW, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14457 (D. Utah Feb. 19, 2010); Williams v. Univ. of Ga. Athletic 
Dep‘t, No. 3:10-CV-81 CDL-MSH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134214 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 
2010); Romero v. Cal. Dep‘t of Transp., No. CV 08-8047 PSG (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 
2009); Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 
2d 1088 (S.D. Cal. 2008); InfoMath, Inc. v. Univ. of Ark., 633 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D. 
Ark. 2007); De Romero v. Inst. of Puerto Rican Culture, 466 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D.P.R. 
2006); Hairston v. N.C. Agric. & Tech. State Univ., No. 1:04CV1203, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20442 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2005); Competitive Techs., Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 333 F. Supp. 
2d 858 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); McGuire v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., No. 2:99-CV-1231, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21615 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2000). 
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and trademark without paying just compensation, 
the jurisdiction of the federal court shall include 
States, state instrumentalities, state employees, and 
persons acting under color of state law as 
defendants the same as individuals, partnerships, 
companies, or corporations.  Neither the Eleventh 
Amendment nor any other doctrine of sovereign 
immunity shall act as a bar to such action.
276
 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the vast majority of United States history, the Eleventh 
Amendment proved to not be a bar to patent and copyright suits in 
federal court.  In Seminole, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
had no power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I 
of the Constitution, negating the action that Congress took in 1990 
and 1992 to make it clear that states should be defendants in 
sovereign patent and copyright infringement actions.  In the 
Florida Prepaid cases, the Supreme Court stated that even though 
patents are property, there was no constitutional taking under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the Federal Circuit could only 
identify eight cases in 110 years before the Florida Prepaid cases, 
and the report that accompanied the legislation did not discuss state 
remedies.  Therefore, the legislation was not proportional to harm 
that it attempted to prevent.  However, as this paper has shown, 
there is now an ample supply of dismissed lawsuits against states, 
 
276  With the massive changes to the Patent Act promulgated by the America Invents Act 
(H.R. 1249), and signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011, it should 
be noted that § 296, the section that related to sovereign immunity and states, was 
retained unchanged.  This could be construed as Congress‘ intent to still hold states liable 
for infringement.  Section 296 provides: 
(a) In general.--Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any 
officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State, acting in 
his official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh 
amendment of theConstitution of the United States or under any other 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any 
person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for 
infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any other violation 
under this title. 
35 U.S.C. § 296 (West 2012).  
  
2012] STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY REVISITED 565 
and there is a lack of available state remedies sufficient to make it 
a ―taking‖ under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Katz case, which holds that the states waived sovereign 
immunity when they agreed to a uniform system of bankruptcy, 
was decided in the interim.  The composition of the Supreme Court 
has also changed over the years since Seminole and the Florida 
Prepaid cases.  Chief Justice Roberts has replaced Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan have 
replaced Justices O‘Connor, Stevens, and Souter.  The new 
Justices just might provide the new insight to overrule the blip on 
the screen of sovereign immunity and intellectual property cases. 
Let us be hopeful that the lower courts will recognize the 
current pattern of uncompensated infringement, and send another 
case to the Supreme Court to end the immunity of states for 
infringement of intellectual property. 
 
